A wave of discussion about British Columbia’s liquor laws has recently swamped both social media and the traditional media. Much of this discussion has been prompted by a number of high profile issues surrounding the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch’s (the “LCLB”) refusal to grant a special occasion license to a Whistler pride event and a condition the LCLB placed on the Rio Theatre’s license that it cannot show movies at any time while holding the liquor license. Vancouver’s Mayor, Gregor Robertson, has picked up this issue and has signalled that the city supports the Rio and would like the LCLB to reform the rules. Additional pieces by reform stalwarts Mark Hicken (a lawyer in Vancouver) and Kurtis Kolt (a highly respected independent wine consultant) have further catalyzed the debate.

Amongst all the chatter I have noted a continued misstatement or misapprehension of the legal structures that create and give jurisdiction to both the B.C. Liquor Distribution Branch (the “LDB”) and the LCLB. Calls to reform “liquor laws” are imprecise and regularly inaccurate, which is a problem when asking for change to big powerful bureaucracies. As a lawyer I feel that it is my duty to clarify how the system works so that proponents of change can understand what it is exactly they are asking to be changed. This article is thus meant as a primer for those who are interested in the legal structure of these issues and I hope it will contribute to the dialogue by making discussion more accurate and more precise.

The Legal Structure of the Liquor Bureaucracy in British Columbia

Liquor in British Columbia is governed by two entities, the LDB and the LCLB. Each of these entities was created by an act of the legislature of British Columbia. The LDB was created by the Liquor Distribution Act (the “LDA”) and the LCLB was created by the Liquor Control and Licensing Act (the “LCA”). Both the LDB and LCLB operate under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General.

The LDB is responsible for the sale and distribution of alcohol in the Province and the LCLB is responsible for alcohol licensing and enforcement of offences under the LCA along with license conditions.

These acts give the Lieutenant Governor in Council (i.e. the executive branch of government) the authority to pass regulations. The most important regulation is passed pursuant to the LCA and is called the Liquor Control and Licensing Regulation.

And even further down the chain, the LDB and the LCLB have the legal authority to create certain “policies”. Most policies are not publically published, though they must be made publically available on request. However, this is the meat of where most decisions that impact the industry are made.

Policies are subordinate to the regulations and the legislation. This means that LDB and LCLB policies must be consistent with the acts that grant these entities the authority to create such policies. Additionally, there are a number of legal principles that restrict the creation of policies and the manner in which policies are implemented by the LDB and LCLB. This area of law, known as administrative law, is extremely complex but also fundamentally important to understanding what the LDB and LCLB can and cannot do.

The Acts

The Acts are the source of authority for the LDB and the LCLB. These establish the structure of the organizations and grant them the discretion to make decisions with respect to a very wide array of matters pertaining to liquor.

For example, the LCA prohibits any person from selling liquor without a license and requires licensees to purchase all liquor from the Liquor Distribution Branch.

As a further example, the LDA grants government control of all liquor distribution and retailing in the Province. In particular, it requires all liquor sold in the province to go through the LDB, it requires that title to all liquor be surrendered to the government upon entering the Province, and it places all liability for losses, damages or costs upon importers, retailers and other private entities.

The LDA also grants the general manager of the LDB the authority to create specific restrictions on the storage and movement of liquor, including the physical structure, operations and security measures of all facilities storing liquor prior to retailing (i.e. the ability to govern warehousing in the Province).

The Regulations

The most important regulation is the Liquor Control and Licensing Regulation, which was promulgated pursuant to the LCA. It sets out the various restrictions on license types such as liquor primaries, food primaries, agents, retailers and wineries (both commercial and land based).

For example, these restrictions include (at s. 8(2)) barring granting or transfer of a Liquor Primary License to entities that are predominantly by or directed to minors, motion picture theatres, restaurants and video arcades.

The regulations (s. 14(1)) also grant the LCLB the authority to control the sale of food and the consumption of liquor on premises licensed as Liquor Retail Stores.

The Policies

As I mentioned earlier, the policies are the real meat for the majority of issues in the industry. Examples of policies include the restriction on LRS’s not to sell food or coffee, the LDB “mark up” of 123% for wine, use of inefficient forms and methods to sell and order wine, and the ban on corkage.

Policies must be consistent with the legislation that governs the given agency. In other words, there must both be legislative authority to implement a policy and that policy cannot conflict with other parts of the relevant statutes and regulations.

The Legal Basis for Challenge

The various legal bases for challenging decisions of the LDB and LCLB, including challenging policies, are quite vast. I will only outline the basic parameters of the most important administrative law principles and remedies.

The most important concept to understand in the liquor context is “discretion”. The LDA and the LCA grant the LDB and LCLB quite a broad discretion to make decisions. This includes, for example, the LCLB’s discretion to grant licenses and the LDB’s discretion to set prices, grant a direct shipping exemption to B.C. wineries, or appoint agency stores.

However, there are rules that restrict the exercise of this discretion. It is an abuse of discretion, for example, if the LCLB takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take into account relevant considerations, if it makes a decision for an ulterior purpose or in bad faith, or if it fetters its discretion.

This idea of “fettering” discretion is especially important with respect to the LDB and LCLB because most of the issues arise from policies that they create. It is a fettering of discretion to rely on an inflexible policy without considering the individual merits of a particular matter. Many of the complaints I have been reading about in the media arise out of these sorts of inflexible policies. If such policies are too inflexible, and decisions are made in reliance on these inflexible policies, then such decisions are susceptible to a “judicial review”, which is a petition to the court to review the decision made by an agency (in this case the LDB and LCLB).

If this petition is successful the court can “quash” the LDB or LCLB decision and return it to the relevant board for reconsideration. Reconsideration must be made in accordance with the reasons provided by the judge. As such, judges can create parameters that restrict the LDB and LCLB decisions in the future. However, judges cannot, in most cases, tell the LDB and LCLB what to decide. Rather, they can only restrict the manner in which the decision must be made. Courts will also sometimes provide comment on what they view to be reasonable. All of this can lead to the LDB or LCLB reversing its decision.

There are other principles such as bias and procedural fairness that restrict the manner in which the LDB and LCLB can make decisions.

The second fundamental way in which to legally challenge an LDB or LCLB decision is by way of a jurisdictional argument. The LDB and LCLB can only make decisions if they are made in accordance with the authority granted to them under the LDA and LCA, respectively.

In the case of the LDB, there is little, if any, direct legislative authority for most of their policies. Rather, the LDB is operating mostly on a discretionary basis. Since policies are essentially the nuts and bolts of how the LDB is run, these nuts and bolts are subject to the general principles discussed above. That is, the discretion to implement these policies must be exercised reasonably. It is unreasonable, for example, to consider something that is entirely irrelevant to the decision being made. Determining whether or not something is relevant can be complex and requires analysis of the wording and the purpose of the legislation, regulations, and policies at issue.

In conclusion, there are quite a few legal avenues by which the actions and decisions of the LDB and LCLB can be challenged. The arguments can be complex and require lawyers, but this is a proven and effective method to challenge certain decisions. However, one cannot change the acts (the LDA or LCA) or the regulations by legal challenge unless they violate the constitution. That said, courts will provide interpretation of statutory provisions that can be beneficial to those who wish to challenge LDB and LCLB decisions.

The Political Basis for Challenge

While all policies must be reasonable and within jurisdiction, any policy that meets the administrative law requirements will be upheld by the court. The only way to challenge these policies is for the LDB or LCLB to change them internally.

Additionally, if change is to be made to the act then these changes must be made by the provincial legislature. Any change to regulations must be made by the executive (i.e. the Ministry).

The incongruity I have been seeing is that many call for the “law” to be reformed without considering whether they are asking the government to change the act, the regulations or LDB and LCLB policies. Each of these requires a completely different mechanism and involves very different stakeholders. It is also important to consider that any changes to the act are likely to still grant the LDB and LCLB considerable discretion. Thus, the question becomes: what changes are most likely to ensure the consistent results I want in the future?

The LDB and LCLB have always slightly modified their policies over time to ensure that no major challenge is made to their overall structure. Those interested in reform must therefore question whether all they want is a change in a policy or whether they want a change to the structure of the organizations. If structural change is desired, then reformers must ask what is the effective mechanism to both achieve this change and to ensure that changes to the governing act and regulations translate into policies that ‘reformers’ want to see and prevent policies that ‘reformers’ want to avoid.

I would also note that most of the complaints about the LCLB pertain to the regulation and policies, while most of the complaints about the LDB pertain both to policies and to the fundamental restrictions on the industry created by the LDA.

I think it is fundamentally important for those discussing reform to aim their hammers at the correct nail and make sure their efforts land squarely on the appropriate entities. Otherwise, such discussions risk diffusion and present opportunities for political misdirection.

*The author practices law in Vancouver. His profile and contact information can be found by clicking here

1. Consumer Choice

The main benefit from allowing corkage is to increase consumer choice. Currently, consumers, and particularly wine aficionados, are limited to restricted wine lists when they dine unless they go to one of the very few establishments in the city with an extensive list. Even then, these lists are often priced out of the budget of most diners and so choice again becomes limited.

Because restaurants are restricted to purchasing wine from government liquor stores, unless they order a case or more of a particular wine, their selection is also limited by what government liquor stores sell. Consumers with a particular interest in wine, however (i.e. those most likely to use corkage), often have bottles of wine that are not available in government liquor stores, in B.C. at all, or even in external markets (if they have been cellaring wine for some time). These consumers now cannot enjoy their passion and their collections at restaurants without the private ‘ok’ of the manager or owner of that restaurant (a ‘benefit’ generally reserved for those in the industry and a few special friends of the industry). An owner takes a risk every time he or she allows this practice as it is technically illegal and could lead to a fine.

It is an obvious reality that consumer choice while dining would be improved with the legalization of corkage.

2. Enabling the market

The tricky aspect of corkage is that restaurants are afraid it will take away from their much needed alcohol revenues. Jake has made some reasonable conjectures as to why this might not be so in his article; however, I will make a slightly more first principles argument here.

One of the big questions in our society is the extent to which government should regulate a market. It is naive to think that markets can or should exist without regulation – this sort of free enterprisism has long proven untenable. Rather, the question today is how can regulation best enable and govern a market so as to make it maximally efficient and fair. Thus anti-competition laws exist to prevent the monopolization of essential services, and banking and investment laws exist to prevent fraud, etc.

It is common belief that the regulatory system for liquor in British Columbia is broken. It does not foster an efficient market nor is it fair. Corkage is but one small example of this system, but it is one that needs reform. So let’s tackle the question from the two underlying bases for regulating markets.

a. Efficient Markets

Right now, restaurants base their business models off of a particular mark up they set for their wine and liquor sales. They project the amount of liquor they will sell and multiply it by their mark up to make projections of revenue. Illegal corkage eliminates one factor in this equation and thus makes it simpler. It could be argued, then, that corkage makes the restaurant industry more efficient in projecting revenue by eliminating an uncontrollable unknown.

On the other hand, markets do not operate only on the supply side. On the demand side, consumers face reduced efficiency when dining out because they are forced to pay full restaurant mark ups. Their access to the market is restricted by the restaurant’s choice of beverage. The government further restricts this access by forcing restaurants to buy at full retail from government liquor stores and forcing restaurants to commit to at least a case of any spec wine not listed in a government store. Consumers have increased their efficiency and market access for their own personal consumption by going to private stores and bringing wine across the border. However, the combination of government rules governing restaurants limits this increase in efficiency to private events and private consumption. Thus, no corkage actually makes dining out less efficient, particularly for wine lovers.

I know for a fact that wine aficionados will often choose to stay home and drink wine rather than go out or when they do go out will choose not to buy wine at the restaurant because a) it is not what they want and b) the price is too high compared to a private retail store.

If corkage were allowed, this would open the market to greater efficiencies that would allow new business models to succeed. Some old business models that relied on the demand side inefficiencies in the market might have to reconsider their approach, but that does not mean that the industry will die and all restaurants will go out of business. It will simply militate in favour of different business models. It will also prompt restaurants to build better lists or innovative programs that cannot be duplicated by bringing your own bottle.

However, there is certainly risk for restaurants in Vancouver if corkage were allowed. In his article Jake suggests that in San Francisco, where corkage is a regular phenomenon, diners don’t overwhelm restaurants with their own bottles. However, in San Francisco, restaurants receive a wholesale discount, which makes their wine list prices more reasonable compared to retail prices vs. Vancouver. Unless thought through carefully, some Vancouver restaurants would likely suffer, particularly if knowledge of corkage became common place.

Despite this, I still believe that the demand side inefficiencies need correction and that the supply side gains by banning corkage do not outweigh the demand side gains of allowing corkage. This combined with an incentive for innovation on the supply side is a strong argument in favour of corkage.

b. Fairness

Regulation is also about fairness. Markets aren’t just about money, they are also about distribution and a fair society. Restaurants and wine lists are pretty low on the list of concerns for regulating society, but fairness still plays a role here. Is it fair for the government to restrict consumer choice and enjoyment because (they claim) the restaurant industry wants them to?

First, while I know many in the industry are against corkage, there are those who are not. The industry is not entirely unified on this issue. Should those who are willing to innovate be punished for deviating from the status quo?

Second, the government of B.C. represents all British Columbians and all industries. No one wants to see restaurants fail. That said, there is no reasonable rationale to restrict restaurants from allowing consumers to bring their own wine. Legalizing corkage would not force restaurants to allow it. In fact, in Toronto when corkage was legalized very few restaurants initially offered it, and it became somewhat of a niche thing. This would likely also happen in Vancouver. This likely slow transition would allow restaurants to adapt to the change over time and eventually open up. I do not think that restaurants will face a rush of people demanding that they bring their wine in for $10-$20 or they won’t dine. Vancouverites simply care too much about good food to do that.

It is not fair for the government to restrict restaurants from offering a service that consumers want simply on the basis of a perceived fear that consumer demand might change the industry. Equivalents in other industries (e.g. telecoms) have prevented consumer choice and fair pricing for years.

3. Industry Contradictions

By fighting corkage the restaurant industry is undermining its attempts to achieve other reform. Consumers in British Columbia will find it a lot harder to support reforms that would allow restaurants to receive wholesale pricing, to buy from private stores, or to buy spec wines by the bottle if that same industry fights corkage. This is precisely the image that the restaurant industry wants to avoid because it will alienate the very people they need to support them in their efforts for reforms that will matter far more to them.

Wholesale pricing would increase revenues to an extent far beyond any perceived loss that would occur as the result of corkage. By acting in a contradictory fashion, the restaurant industry risks undermining these efforts and eroding consumer’s faith in their honesty and commitment to good service and value for the consumer.

4. Fine Wine Culture

Corkage exists in every city with a strong fine wine culture. I think the French would revolt if this were taken away – Montreal would lose its vivacity as a city for fine wine and food. Corkage prompts wine lovers to share their great bottles with friends in one of the city’s great restaurants. There is no greater pleasure than getting together with some friends and each contributing to a dinner prepared by one of the city’s great chefs. It fosters culture and appreciation.

The local wine industry would benefit from this practice. Yes currently many restaurants carry B.C. wines, including many of the harder to find ones. But it is inconceivable that a province with a vibrant wine industry has illegalized corkage. This would be sacrilege in Napa Valley, which seems to have been pretty good at understanding marketing and fostering appreciation. If consumers could bring back wine they purchased on their holidays to their favourite restaurants in Vancouver and relive some of those moments – well, that would mimic precisely what has made San Francisco such a hub for wine in the United States. Surely B.C. and Vancouver wants to create these sorts of touristic moments for locals and visitors alike?

Conclusion

Restaurants don’t look that good by standing in the way of legalizing corkage. In fact, I’d argue they look just about as draconian and old school as the bureaucracy they decry so often. I understand their concerns, but surely the answer isn’t to cower in fear behind an outmoded law? How can our province and the wine industry ever progress when these sorts of attitudes predominate? I challenge restaurants to consider the larger ramifications of their position against corkage and to see business opportunities rather than lost profits. In fact, why not argue that if corkage is allowed, restaurants should also receive a wholesale discount? The government will certainly balk at any reduced revenues, but consistency is absolutely fundamental to any reform of the liquor system in B.C. Beginning this process on a negative note by arguing against corkage is certainly not the way to change this province’s regulations for the better.

The BCLDB announced that it is looking to partner with a single financial institution to implement this new credit card. Why is this happening? My guess is because the BCLDB did not hit its revenue target last year and so it is looking for ways to make a quick buck. Partnering with a single financial institution is sure to include a deal that this institution pay a significant amount of money to BCLDB for the privilege of carrying hundreds of millions of dollars of private company debt.

In my opinion, this is another example of a flat out abuse of power by the BCLDB and it infringes on businesses rights. The BCLDB is losing revenue because their stores and service are inferior compared to their private counterparts. Rather than realize that the private sector is doing a better job and seeking to help them succeed (and thus pay more taxes), the BCLDB is implementing another inane policy that only impacts their myopic short term goals.

The real problem here is that this sort of insanity will likely not end with this policy. As the BCLDB continues to lose revenues to private stores that are more efficient, offer better selection and better service they will continue to implement these sort of underhanded and anti-competitive tactics to prop up their lagging revenue.

Is it not time to get rid of this “bully in the playground” – the BCLDB? I say yes.

The question about privatizing or reforming liquor regulations in BC does not require us to start debating large scale political economy, of which there are dozens upon dozens of perspectives and approaches. Some arguments I’ve read say that privatizing BC Liquor will lead to less safety because all unregulated industries are unsafe. Despite attempts to do so, certainly no one can rationally claim that liquor regulation reform in B.C. is related to lax mining regulation in Chile or elsewhere that benefits private companies over the safety of employees. What matters isn’t some big question about privatization generally in all industries everywhere, but really just about whether it makes sense to privatize (or at least reform) in this particular industry in this particular province.

Whether or not privatization makes sense must be understood from a number of perspectives: tax dollars, consumers, business owners, restaurants, sommeliers, wineries, etc. It is not about business owners vs. union workers. This debate is also not about class – that’s a complete red herring that has led to irrational arguments from all ‘sides’ of this debate. Rather, the debate is about fairness.

To take a big view here, the main problem is the simple one that the regulator is a competitor and therefore is in a conflict of interest. Most of the problems with the BCLDB stem from this conflict of interest. Privatization is one way to remove this conflict of interest and allow the regulator to regulate the industry the way it is supposed to. No other regulatory system in BC works like this because such systems are generally seen to be contrary to natural justice.

This conflict of interest has created a huge number of problems that have created detriments to each of the groups I listed above: consumers, restaurants, sommeliers, BC wineries, and business owners. The BCLDB’s conflict of interest harms each of these groups differently, but it is consistent in negatively impacting each of these groups.

I will go through each group and list some ways that the BCLCB’s conflict of interest impacts them:

1. Consumers have less selection, cannot pay corkage in restaurants, cannot bring wine back with them from vacation (note Alberta only charges a flat $3/bottle in duty for casual importers coming back from vacation), and cannot buy wine direct from wineries outside BC. All of this is effectively a control by the BCLDB on some basic economic freedoms that all consumers should have.

2. Restaurants: Because restaurants do not get wholesale prices, restaurants cannot operate with alcohol margins that are at all similar to any other major city in the world. As I’ve recently learned, most restaurants in BC have to operate at a 45% cost margin. Some go to 50%, a very few push it at 35%. Internationally most restaurants are at 35%. It is harder to keep restaurants open in B.C. and to run good wine programs because of the unfair practice of not allowing restaurants to have wholesale prices.

Additionally, restaurants cannot order directly from importers and private stores, vastly reducing selection and impacting business relationships. Prices are dictated by the BCLDB so restaurants cannot effectively negotiate special deals or more dynamic business relationships. This stilts the industry because the BCLDB does not want competition in an area where it could not compete: service and specialization.

3. Sommeliers: Sommeliers cannot develop good wine programs or take risks because their margins are too low. They cannot split cases of special orders with sommeliers at other restaurants, even though the BCLDB would make the same amount of money from the sale. Why can’t they share costs and make this sort of business relationship? This is another irrational rule. Sommeliers leave Vancouver when they get to a certain level because no restaurant here can afford to pay the good ones to stay. They simply do not make enough money off of developing challenging and extensive wine programs.

4. BC Wineries: If BC wineries want to sell their wine at the BCLDB, they have to take a huge discount hit. The required discount is so high that most BC wineries would not be able to survive by selling their wines through the BCLDB. This means they have to either go through private stores, restaurants or sell direct. So far this has worked ok, but the market is getting more saturated. Wineries need as many sales outlets as possible. The BCLDB rules don’t allow this.

It is illegal for wineries to set up off-site tasting rooms, say in Vancouver. Most other wine regions in the world have off-site tasting rooms. This helps promote the wines. Why is this illegal in BC? Does the government not want to support the industries within its own province? Is it viewing BC wineries as competition to its own BCLDB sales? This makes no sense and is fundamentally unfair and shows a large lack of foresight.

5. Business Owners: Let’s forget about the big corporations. They are actually doing quite well in the current market because the BCLDB structure supports big corporations by buying wines with high sales volumes. The BCLDB is far less interested in small businesses because they cannot stock all their stores uniformly with such products. Thus, the BCLDB will stack case upon case of yellow tail and oyster bay wines (which are basically products that deplete the soils and destroy the environment where they are grown), but they will not bring in that many wines from tiny guys growing interesting biodynamic wines. Who is bringing in these wines to the province? Private wine stores with passionate owners.

Right now it is impossible for a wannabe small business owner to pursue their love and passion and start a small wine shop dedicated to, say, biodynamic Italian Wine, or something like that. The regulations make it impossible to afford or obtain a licence and operate with margins reasonable enough for small businesses (which, remember, often require higher margins than the big retailers who can afford the hit much more given economies of scale).

Private stores (mostly) cannot source their own products, like they do in so many other places. Small business owners also cannot afford to navigate the minefield of BC wine regulations, which can require legal counsel. Small guys can’t afford that. The business model for small businesses in liquor is pretty much an impossible one in B.C. Thus, the winners are the very few big companies that get their high volume products listed in the BCLDB or use large scale corporate economies of scale business models. Why do the top 10 agents in B.C. get 80% of the profits from wine sales in the province? The BCLDB makes that possible. Thus, contrary to what many may believe or what appears to be the case on the surface, the BCLDB policies and regulations actually make it harder, not easier, for small businesses to survive. Those same policies support large companies and huge scale wineries.

The conflict of interest is that the BCLDB wants tax dollars, but they are making consumer’s choices for them because of their particular vision of how to sell wine. The BCLDB is not equipped to create the nuanced choices that become available in an open and private market. They also have no interest in doing so. That is pretty darn unfair.

There are many more arguments, but I just wanted to clarify the problem as the discussion has gone way off course from my perspective. Privatization is one solution, but it is not the only possible solution. The main question is how do we fix this conflict of interest and make the sale of liquor in B.C. more fair? Everything flows from that.

Here are a few highlights:

“Monopolies lock up economic value, and uncompetitive markets hold back innovation and value creation, leaving untapped revenue ‘on the table.’”
“…in order to ensure the socially responsible sale and use of beverage alcohol, it is not necessary for government to own and operate retail and wholesale facilities itself.”

“The government should be using 21st century strategies to fulfill its indispensable role of safeguarding social responsibility in the sale, distribution and use of beverage alcohol. We are proposing that the Ontario government withdraw from ownership and operation of wholesale and retail beverage alcohol business, and instead create a regulated but competitive marketplace.”

“The forces driving change include
• rising and shifting customer expectations about service quality, localized products and pricing;
• the reality that the current “big box” retail store model will mature, and new formats will be required;
• the need to improve productivity and lower costs instead of raising retail prices;
• the imperative to provide maximum value to owners, whether private-sector or government.”

“We share the view that alcohol pricing is a key aspect of social responsibility. Therefore our strategy for transforming the beverage alcohol system maintains a minimum-price policy. Deep discount pricing at the retail level should be prohibited. While we envisage price competition in a more open marketplace, we are adamant that retailers not be allowed to sell beverage alcohol at prices below the minimum price set by the government. This approach is based on the recognition that pricing is one of the most effective tools for reinforcing socially responsible use of alcohol.”

“After consultation, research and analysis, we have unanimously concluded that the best approach for improving the beverage alcohol system is to introduce a licensing system. The government would grant, through an auction process, fixed-term licences to perform specified wholesale and retail functions, including those the government now performs itself. Of the options we considered, this one best met the goals of improving government revenue, increasing market access and flexibility for suppliers, widening consumer choice and convenience and enhancing market competition, while focusing the government’s role on regulation.

By pursuing this option, the government would preserve the equivalent of its present revenue stream from charges on the commodity and also realize significant additional revenue by auctioning the rights to wholesale and retail beverage alcohol. It is anticipated that costs would be linked with the transition to the new structure. We estimate that, following a transition period, the licensing approach could yield incremental value to the province of $200 million or more annually.”

“Some may prefer to keep the system as it is and muddle through. This, however, would solidify the existing vested interests and make it much harder to effect change in the future. After 78 years, action is long overdue. It is time to transform Ontario’s beverage alcohol system. I close with what I believe are the real outcomes of our recommendations:
1. the consumer would get greater convenience and choice and would benefit from a competitive retail environment;
2. the government would remove itself from investment risk while increasing its annual revenues;
3. Ontario would continue to benefit from sound social responsibility practices; and
4. the existing commercial inequities would have been materially addressed.”

Clearly some have already thought about the privatization issue in great depth and come out in favour of privatization if implemented in the correct manner. If you have the time it is worth reading the full report, which you can find here.

The exact wording is:

M-601 — November 25, 2010 — Mr. Cannan (Kelowna—Lake Country) — That, in the opinion of the House, the Canadian wine industry, the Canadian tourism industry and Canadian consumers would benefit from an amendment to the Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act to allow any person to import, send, take or transport Canadian wine into any province or territory directly from a winery, liquor board, liquor commission or similar outlet for the sale of wine located in any other province or territory within Canada for consumption by that person and not for resale, further distribution, sale or for any use other than personal consumption

This is a huge deal for many reasons. First, wineries in BC and Ontario would finally be able to ship wine to customers in other provinces, helping them improve the diversity of their customer base. This will ultimately have the impact of growing the industry.

Second, the language of the motion suggests that customers in one province will be able to buy Canadian wine from either a liquor board or private store in another province for personal use. This would not only allow consumers access to a much wider variety of selection, but it would also put pressure on the jurisdictions with higher liquor markups to reduce prices in order to compete with the liquor boards and private outlets in other provinces.

Third, the motion, if tabled as a bill and passed, creates a possibility that this could extend to wines other than Canadian wines. If consumers get used to buying Canadian wine online, and private retailers and wineries start getting innovative with this new legal space, then demand for interprovincial shipment of non-Canadian wine across interprovincial borders could ensue.

Fourth, it would not be hard to extend this language to include Canadian beer, not just Canadian wine. BC’s craft brewing scene is growing exponentially these days. Easy access to a national market would be a good thing for both our local brewers and any brewers in other provinces. It could potentially be the beginning of a craft brewing revolution in Canada. Of course, this is hopeful thinking for a law that is a mere chrysalis right now. But, the potential is huge.

This is potentially the first step in a major reform of the laws governing wine in Canada and an important step to modernizing the rules governing the industry in this country. We will now have to wait and see if this motion becomes a bill and eventually a law – which is a long and complex process with many barriers. For now, this is welcome and very important news.

I recommend writing your local MP to express support for this motion. The more letters the better chance this will actually become law.

In this article I will argue that privatization will produce higher tax revenues, a superior liquor distribution system, better selection, better prices, better service and a better wine culture in British Columbia.

I have no affiliations with anyone in the liquor industry and am a completely independent voice in this debate.

The BCLDB is an Affront to Basic Legal Principles

As a lawyer who has a degree of experience dealing with government agencies, I must say that the BC Liquor Distribution Branch may be the most obfuscated body in the entire BC government. It routinely violates principles of administrative law that include open access to information, transparency and fair hearings and decisions. Its markup system underhandedly violates principles of tax law by effectively taxing liquor 123% without requiring a vote in the legislature (i.e. taxation without representation).

Consensus in the legal community across Canada is that the BCLDB (and all provincial liquor monopolies) violate the Canadian Constitution by restricting interprovincial shipments of alcohol. Nearly identical restrictions in U.S. states have been deemed unconstitutional in the US by the United States Supreme Court. The clause in the U.S. constitution that restricts these practices is similar to the clause at issue in the Canadian constitution.

Reforming the BCLDB will Increase Tax Revenues

Internal audits of the retail operations of the BCLDB have revealed (1) that retail operations cost the government $300 million and (2) that sales of liquor at the BCLDB are declining whereas sales at private liquor stores are increasing.

Eliminating the retail operations of the BCLDB would produce the following results:

1. Save the government $300 million a year in operations costs. This would cost unionized workers their jobs, but it is not the government’s duty to pay shelf stockers $20+/hour. Do you think your tax dollars should pay union staff without any knowledge or respect for the products they sell? What value add is that?

2. Increase tax revenues. Not only would the government save $300 million a year in operating costs, it would still receive tax revenue from all the products sold in the province. Given that private retail sales are increasing, this will result in increased revenues. I will examine why private retail sales are increasing and BCLDB sales decreasing in a future section. In hard economic times it is better to increase revenue rather than lose revenue in order to prop up an antiquated union.

3. Level the playing field. Right now the BCLDB is the wholesaler, regulator and main retailer in the province. In other words, it governs its competitors and controls the flow of products to its competitors. This has resulted in anti-competetive practices. For example, the BCLDB regularly takes shipments of wine intended for private stores and puts them in their own stores. The BCLDB regularly short ships product and takes no responsibility for it. The BCLDB has exempted itself from liquor safety inspectors while the private sector is not exempt. By getting out of the retail game, the BCLDB will not have the incentive to distort the market to its advantage.

Better Distribution

It is not just the BCLDB’s retail operations that are problematic. The wholesale operations produce huge problems. The system is setup to make it difficult to obtain products that are not “listed” items – i.e. items the BCLDB has chosen to carry at its stores. Most of the interesting wines in the province are “spec” or “special order” items, which require a case purchase.

Further, wholesalers are afraid to bring product into the province that is not “listed” but is only “spec” or “special order” because it is harder to sell this product due to the regulatory restrictions governing it. This means less selection, a topic I address below. It also means a distorted distribution system controlled by the BCLDB buyers.

One retail operation’s buyers are therefore impacting and restricting the entire wholesale system for all retail operations in the province.

Additionally, all product must go through a government bonded warehouse. This process can take months. If an agent wants product for Christmas season, they have to order it months ahead of time and have inventory sitting around in the government warehouse in hopes it will be purchased. They cannot take as many risks with this business model because of the sheer amount of inventory they are required to carry.

Agents (importers) are also not allowed to access their own product. Only the retailers can access the agent’s product once they decide to purchase it. So wholesalers are effectively cut off from their own inventory.

Further, storage conditions are not guaranteed at this warehouse, which for any specialist merchant is a nightmare of breaking the chain of provenance. Top retailers in the U.S. and Europe would never accept this practice.

Lastly, restaurants cannot order directly from importers/agents, but must order at retail prices through the BCLDB retail stores. They can then apply for a minimal tax benefit after the fact.

Privatization of the wholesale side of liquor would:

1. Create a more efficient distribution system. Agent/Importers would be able to create more nimble business operations and operate on greater margins, increasing revenue, increasing jobs and increasing taxes paid.

2. Allow retailers and restaurants to obtain the product they want when they want. This means both retailers and restaurants could decrease their on hand inventory, creating better business models and increasing the likelihood of a successful business. Small business, employees and tax collectors all win in this situation.

3. Protect the Provenance of Artisanal Products. Provenance is key to ensuring that artisanal products do not spoil. If importers could ensure the quality of the warehouse in which they store their products, this will decrease the amount of damage to the wine and other liquor – such as dried out corks and heat damage. Again, this is a fundamental aspect to any fine liquor operation anywhere in the world.

I would add the caveat that any private wholesale system would have to be set up to avoid the problems encountered in the U.S. where a small number of wholesalers dominate the market. Of course, it is telling that even with this problem the U.S. has better selection, better prices, and better service.

Better Selection

The province is plagued with poor selection compared to our neighbours to the south who have a privatized retail and wholesale system. By way of comparison I looked at the selection of Rhone and Alsace wines at the entire BCLDB chain compared to a top retail store in San Francisco (K&L) and a top retail store in Manhattan (Astor). K&L has 223 wines from the Rhone in stock and 40 from Alsace. Astor has 87 wines from the Rhone currently in stock and 34 from Alsace. The BCLDB is 119 wines from the Rhone and 28 from Alsace in stock across 200 stores. Astor has 1 store and K&L has 3. If you compare the number of Rhone or Alsace wines available in just one major city in the US like SF or NYC, it will far surpass the BCLDB. Even single stores best the entire provincial liquor system for selection.

Go onto the K&L website, or for a broader perspective try wine searcher, and look at the 2000+ wines available from California at various price points. Most of those don’t make it into BC. Let’s consider top CA producers that are not at any BCLDB outlets: Alban, Sine Qua Non, Pax, Saxum, Turley, Harlan, Colgin, Kapscandy, Corrison, Beckmen, Ojai, Line Collado, Philip Togni, Spottswoode, Sean Thackrey etc. etc. If you can find these wines in BC they are at private stores. In California you can either get on a mailing list, go to a auction service like Vinfolio, or simply go to a store like K&L on the release date. There are 0 California wines at the BCLDB that you can’t get in California. The top California wines the BCLDB carries – Ridge, Shafer, Dominus, etc. – are all available easily in San Francisco at grocery stores or an average retail shop. That’s not good selection.

Manhattan and San Francisco have dozens of wine stores selling great wines across the city and have developed wine stores suited to appeal to different niches of consumers (e.g. Terroir SF, Chambers Street Wine NYC). Right now, because of BCLDB retail operations and restrictions on private licenses, there are very few niche private stores in BC. It is impossible for new niche stores to develop because the distribution system severely restricts the kinds of products they can stock.

Only one store in BC (Marquis Wine Cellars) has the ability to source its own wines on its own wine buying trips to Europe. In San Francisco or New York, this is the norm. Some of the world’s best importers operate out of retail operations in the US. For example, Kermit Lynch, North Berkeley Wine in Berkeley, and Chambers Street Wine in Manhattan.

Better Prices

Given that the BCLDB retail operation costs $300 million, and given that private stores are selling more wine per capita over time, if we privatized we could reduce the level of taxation and increase tax revenue at the same time. This would result in better prices, which would increase sales and offer better quality wines for the average individual who doesn’t want to spend over $20 a bottle.

By way of example, at the recent premium spirits release at the BCLDB, Ridgemont Reserve Bourbon was sold for $75. It is $33 at Astor and K&L. When I lived down in Berkeley I regularly bought California wines for 50% of what they cost in BC. To continue my example from the selection argument, Pax is $45 a bottle in CA, it is $150 here (recently discounted to $90 because it cannot sell). I could get Ridge zins for $25 at a grocery store in Berkeley. They are $50 a bottle here and only available at one of the 3 signature stores.

I could also go to my favourite beer store and choose from 600 different beers, sample them in store, and pay about $6 for a 22oz bottle of amazing beer that is (1) unavailable in BC and (2) if it were available would cost $12. Another example is the Deschuttes Jubel ale that just came into the province at $30 retail. I can buy it for $10-$12 in the US at multiple retail outlets.

Better Service

I can best illustrate the problems in service at the BCLDB with an example.

I am not in the industry, but I have personally seen small restaurant and store buyers turned away in the BCLDB stores to keep stock in for the ‘real customers’. This appears to be some sort of pretend solidarity with the proletariat everyday worker. There are many arguments against this practice. However, I have a simple contrast to highlight the hypocracy. When a large steak house in downtown Vancouver went out of business, it returned all its wine stock to the BCLDB. The staff at the then Thurlow and Alberni store were supposed to price discount this wine at 30% and put it on the floor for ‘everyday customers’ to buy – since all of us ultimately own the system it makes sense to let a wide array of customers buy this sort of stock. These were all high end American wines.

However, the staff was ‘too busy’ to put the stock on the floor for a couple days and when the large Italian Kitchen conglomerate came in with an offer to buy all the wine at discount in one swoop, the BCLDB workers thought ‘hey that’s easier than tagging all these wines and putting them on the floor’. The result? Lost revenue for the BCLDB for selling all the wines at a huge discount to a restaurant that would sell the wines to customers for the regular price. Do I blame Italian Kitchen? No – they had a rare opportunity to actually buy wines at a discount and make margins. But the BCLDB employees’ lazyness won out over their supposed principles this time out. And the BCLDB failed in its role to manage the product of a bankrupt licensee and find the best bidder for the liquidated assets. Pretty much no one wins in that situation.

Let us not forget that the average BCLDB employee has close to no knowledge about the products they are selling and the supermarket style shopping experience at most BCLDB outlets. To see how privatization would create better service overall in the city, all one has to do is go into a great wine store in any city in the US to see how it should be done or one of the better private stores here in Vancouver like Marquis or Kits wine.

Service isn’t just about good floor staff, it is also about a good events and promotions program.

The BCLDB has no way of informing customers of new product arriving in the store other than brief website updates with give random new wines listed, even though they get in 100’s of new products regularly. They run tastings with plastic glasses. At the premium spirits release the BCLDB was pouring $200 bourbons and scotches into 1-inch diameter plastic cups. This is mandated by regulation. That neither respects the spirit or the customer.

It is impossible to buy tickets to BCLDB events online and there are very few events run at all. Compare this to the LCBO (Ontario’s liquor monopoly) events and seminars where people are actually taught something about wine or Marquis Wine’s wine maker dinners and you realize that the BCLDB is not interested in educating consumers or building wine culture. They don’t even have a regular tasting tower in their biggest stores (compare this to the LCBO Summerhill store in downtown Toronto where I got my first tastes of great wine for $1 a glass at their regular tasting tower and $4 a glass at their special weekend premium wine tastings.)

Conclusion

All of this (added to the inane regulatory system – which you can read about on Mark Hicken’s winelaw.ca website) amount to an industry where ideas come to die. Imagine any other industry where ideas and creativity are stifled to support a broken system that doesn’t make anyone happy except for the overpaid shelf stockers. Other examples of Canadian lack of competition like this include the telecommunications industry (how long did it take to get a cell phone competitor in Canada? – prices are still 2x the US) and the dairy industry (go to seattle and revel in their vast selection of French, Spanish and Italian cheese that our milk board prevents from entering canada for fear of competing with the big canadian dairies), etc.

How do we make this happen? The liquor industry needs to step up and give us all a platform on which to sign on. But what we can do as consumers is to talk about the issue with our friends, spread knowledge and information and whenever possible complain to the BCLDB and to our MLA. Big movements usually begin with small steps.

Are we, as Canadians, content with a few large corporations benefiting and small businesses suffering? Are we content with compromised tax revenues, poor prices and selection and mind numbingly bad service?

We will forever remain the nanny state if we prop up this sort of mentality. I, for one, prefer innovation and entrepreneurialism over sameness and bureaucracy. Let us make our province a destination for innovators and investors in wine and liquor. Let us privatize.

My Credentials

NB: I’ve moved this section to the end to highlight that I am not listing my credentials as an argument in thesmelves, but as noted, merely by way of background and for context.

By way of background, I am a lawyer here in Vancouver, British Columbia, with a Juris Doctor from the University of British Columbia. I have also previously worked as a law clerk for the British Columbia Court of Appeal, spent half a year as a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley’s Boalt law school, hold a Master’s degree, and have published several articles on social theory, property law and environmental law. I have written this blog for three years and have developed a robust knowledge of the liquor distribution system in British Columbia and the United States during that time. I have also got to meet a large number of members in the liquor industry in BC, Washington and California and heard their stories. As per my legal training, I have also verified all the facts upon which this argument is based and I have done my own legal research to understand how the system works.

I have no affiliations with anyone in the liquor industry and am a completely independent voice in this debate.

Furthermore, many legal experts knowledgeable about wine law believe that the federal Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act is unconstitutional. Since this act not only prevents BC wineries from shipping direct to other provinces but is also the legal basis for provincial liquor monopolies, a legal challenge will likely result in a massive shakeup of the current liquor monopoly.

While this is good for consumers, it will be bad for BC wineries since they rely on the competitive advantage given to them by the current system. Mark argues that without a large reform of the system now, if NAFTA and GATT challenges or a constitutional challenge is successful, the resulting shakeup of the BC liquor monopoly could seriously impair a BC winery’s ability to compete in the market. What is needed, Mark argues, is back-end assistance to supplement the high costs of BC wine production, and a reform of the liquor distribution system.

This is a fascinating article and, in my opinion, prescient of the future of wine law in BC. If something isn’t done soon, the entire system could unravel and both consumers and BC winery owners will have a lot to worry about. Reform is necessary NOW, as a proactive approach to solving this problem. A reactive approach will surely end up in the death of many businesses in our province. To read the full article, go here.

The Federal Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act dates back to the Prohibition. That’s right, the prohibition. Despite the fact that we as Canadians have long progressed beyond the moral and economic myopia of the prohibition era, we are still governed by a statute created during that period. The fundamental problem with this act is really boiled down by section 3 (1), which reads:

“3. (1) Notwithstanding any other Act or law, no person shall import, send, take or transport, or cause to be imported, sent, taken or transported, into any province from or out of any place within or outside Canada any intoxicating liquor, except such as has been purchased by or on behalf of, and that is consigned to Her Majesty or the executive government of, the province into which it is being imported, sent, taken or transported, or any board, commission, officer or other governmental agency that, by the law of the province, is vested with the right of selling intoxicating liquor.”

To translate the legalese: it is illegal to import liquor into any province unless it has been purchased on behalf of the government of Canada or the government of the province into which it is being imported. In British Columbia, the government has delegated this task to the governmental agency known as the British Columbia Liquor Distribution Branch (BCLDB) and the BC Liquor Control and Licensing Branch, the bane of most BC wine drinker’s existence. The BCLDB is granted its authority and prerogative by the Liquor Distribution Act of British Columbia, which gives the branch the “sole right to purchase, both in and out of British Columbia, liquor for resale and reuse in British Columbia in accordance with the provisions of the Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act (Canada)” (s. 2(2)).

To control liquor in the province, the Liquor Distribution Act has banned consumers from owning any liquor unless it has been obtained from an authorized source. Again, that’s right, it is illegal to own liquor in BC unless you have obtained it from a source authorized by the statute. These sources include: persons or entites authorized under the Liquor Control and Licensing Act (private stores, restaurants, and a few other exceptions), liquor held as “acquired liquor” by the manufacturer or the manufacturer’s agent (hence the proliferation of agents in BC), liquor cleared and charged by customs for personal use, liquor manufactured in BC but not packaged for sale and still within the possession of the manufacturer (what I like to call the home brewer provision), and several other little exceptions we won’t worry about here.

So, let’s unpack all this bureaucratic nonsense.

1. Private Stores and Restaurants

The Liquor Control and Licensing Act authorizes the general manager of the BCLDB to grant licenses and permits to purchase liquor from the branch for resale and reuse. This is why most restaurant wine lists are boring – they all have to buy from the liquor stores and they cannot import wine on their own initiative. What serious sommelier wants to work in such a stilted environment for acquisition of liquor and building an amazing wine list? Not many, and it certainly doesn’t make their job very easy. Also, the private liquor stores HAVE to buy from the BCLDB, which in turn buys from manufacturer’s agents. Of course large established agents have a vested interest in keeping the system as it is and discouraging newcomers. They make more money if the selection is limited. Thus private stores buy from the same old same old agents and have the same crappy stock. That is, except for the few who have grandfathered importation licenses held by entites other than the store (it is illegal to import and retail at the same time) such as Marquis, Liberty and Kits Wine Cellars. Of course, with tax as it is, even these stores don’t have many great bottles under $20 forcing, as John Clerides of Marquis asserted to me, the vast majority of BC wine drinkers to drink swill since the base price of most wines that end up being under $20 in the province is under $10 elsewhere. This makes it near impossible to support small producers, biodynamic producers, etc. within the mass-market, leaving them for the wealthy and the wine geeks only.

2. Manufacturer’s and Their Agents

As I mentioned above, manufacturer’s agents dominate the wine landscape in British Columbia. Many in the industry know this. However, what most people don’t know is the crazy provision of the Liquor Distribution Act that governs these agents: section 6. Section 6 provides that the BC Government “holds title to” (i.e. owns) all liquor in the province as soon as it enters the province. This includes liquor imported by agents. Yes, another moment of astonishment. The BC government owns everything brought into the province even if they didn’t pay for it. Not only that, but section 7 of the same act states that they are not liable for any loss, damage, theft, etc. of these products. So, the government regulates who can bring wine in, is declared legal owner of it, sets out where and how to distribute it, but will not take responsibility for it. Furthermore, subsection (3) states that the BC government acquires title to (owns) all liquor in the province that is bottled in commercial packaging. Thus, as soon as a brewer or winery bottles their product for resale, the government owns it. I will ignore the exemptions under the federal act for the purposes of this post.

So, how do the manufacturer’s and their agents get paid? Well, luckily the government doesn’t just steal the liquor outright. Instead, it pays the agents after it has sold the liquor at its stores or through its distribution channels. Furthermore, under sections 8 and 10 of the Liquor Distribution Act the government can require an agent or manufacturer to repurchase any liquor it wants them to. So, anyone importing liquor into BC has to be willing to assume the risk that they will be forced to repurchase the liquor from the branch. This is obviously a huge bar to any manufacturer, especially a small one, who wants to take a risk in a new market. The British Columbia market is run like a cartel that has not only monopoly power over an industry, but also the means to change the rules and enforce them with civil and criminal charges (i.e., in my opinion, brute force).

3. Customs

We’ve all been seriously annoyed at the 2 bottle personal exemption when bringing wine back into Canada. But few of us know the legal regime that supports this practice, for which we have to turn to section 19 of our best friend the Liquor Distribution Act. Under this section, a “casual importer” (you and me) must surrender all liquor to customs upon entering BC. Of course, remembering trusty section 6 we will remember that the BC government now owns the liquor we just brought into the province, and lest we forget, section 4 makes sure that it is illegal for us to own it unless we follow the procedures of section 19 and repurchase the liquor from the customs officer. That’s right – if you bring in liquor into BC, you forfeit title to it and have to rebuy it from the government. Given our outrageous tax rates, this means bringing liquor into BC, even for the most avid personal collector who still spends tons of money on wine in the province, is an expensive pain in the ass that to my mind violates some pretty important property and economic rights.

The Constitution

Speaking of rights, let us consider how these three harsh situations play out under the Canadian Constitution. First of all, s. 121 of the Constitution Act states: “All Articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of any one of the Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of the other Provinces.” In other words, Canada is a free trade zone within itself. If a product is manufactured within a Canadian province no other province can charge duties against that product. This is all well and good in theory, but as the United States has taught us with their full faith and credit clause, it can take a lot of money and a lot of lawsuits to eliminate shipping bans between states for alcohol. Even after a string of constitutional cases that declared it illegal to discriminate against importing another state’s wine, there are still many US states that ban the practice. So, what hope does Canada have? Well if one of the provincial governments charges a winery or individual for shipping wine across provincial borders and tries to fine or imprison them, a legally ambitious winery or individual might challenge the law on constitutional grounds and succeed. If that happened maybe the Federal government would reform its prohibition era statute and let Canada be the free-trade zone it should be.

The Charter

But what about bringing in liquor internationally? That’s a more difficult situation and the federal government does ultimately have jurisdiction over international trade that courts will likely defer to more readily. However, what if someone were charged criminally for bringing in 3 bottles of wine for personal use without declaring them or paying tax? Section 7 of the Charter of Rights of Freedoms states: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” This is obviously a very complex provision, but is it reasonable for an individual to be criminally charged because they wanted to enjoy a bottle of wine without paying extraordinary taxes on it? Is this an offense really worth a major fine or even imprisonment (for which the importation of intoxicating liquor act provides)? I can’t answer this question, but to my mind, and perhaps I’ve been influenced by my stint studying Constitutional Law in the United States, to deprive someone of their liberty because they didn’t pay tax on a few bottles of wine they are going to drink themselves is certainly not in accord with the principles of fundamental justice and is not, as section 1 of the Charter states, “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”. While provincial governments continue to benefit from their extortionate tax rates on alcohol, particularly in BC, consumers, afficionados and wine geeks continue to pay a disproportinate amount of tax that goes straight into the general revenues of the province. Hence, you wine geeks out there are disproportionally funding the construction of roads, sewers, and even olympic structures. Does this make any sense in a society that is supposedly liberal and free? It certainly doesn’t to me.

Some Wine

I cannot finish this post without quickly writing down my thoughts on the glass of wine that I consumed while writing this diatribe, a 2004 Kilikanoon Oracle Shiraz from the Clare Valley in Australia. This was a pretty inspiring wine and kept me writing with its amazing nose of spice, blueberry, sweet rich dark black fruits, vanilla, chocolate, nutmeg, and eggnog. Incredibly layered and expressive there is definitely french oak use here, but in a very refined way. The palate is simply stunning with amazing fruit concentration and flavours like blackberry, blueberry, raspberry, red delicious apple, dry baking spices, walnuts, chocolate, plums and plum skins. The finish is extremely long and complex while the wine has a surprisingly elegant texture for shiraz and superb balance. The fruit is very expressive, but not too pushy and the oak is a delicate (rather than brutish) backbone for the wine. One of the most complex shiraz’s I’ve tasted. I only wish this wine could predict brighter futures for the BC wine consumer.

Excellent to Excellent+
$80 at BCLDB

Disclaimer: Any errors or omissions are my own. This article does not constitute legal advice.